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Keeping It Intimate  
A Meditation on the Power of Horror 
Sara Beardsworth 
Southern Illinois University - Carbondale  
I have taken the task of giving a reading of the final chapters of The 
Severed Head as an opportunity to take a reflective stance in two respects.1 I 
note, first, this text’s dual historical element: not only the aesthetic 
trajectories themselves but an implicit history that belongs to 
psychoanalysis. Second, I underline the tone of possibility and invitation 
that inhabits Kristeva’s capital visions, which suggests that she does not 
divide aesthetics off from ethics.  
On the historical element generally, the course that Kristeva takes 
through images and symbols clearly presents a movement of modernization 
and secularization in them. Yet she imposes no historical discourse. That the 
theme itself is historical is sharply underlined in her statement that a history 
of decapitation really does exist in the various civilizations.2 However, her 
aesthetic focus gives us the “secret genealogy” between the power of the 
Gorgons and aesthetic experience that follows the course of the centuries. 
Moreover, there are the variants in temporality in these images, as well as 
their contaminations—not least the distinction between the vertical time of 
the icon, on the one hand, and the “prophecy in actuality” of the Figure, on 
the other, the latter opening up the captivating logic of prefigure and 
precursor in this text.3 Above all, it is the connection of the aesthetic with 
intimacy that holds off any historical discourse as such. This connection is 
present from the outset, where it takes on an anthropological flavor. In skull 
worship the worked exhibition of the capital vestiges of the invisible (death) is 
the outset of a trajectory in which: 
for hundreds and thousands of years, and by continually 
returning to…the interiorization [of human sacrifice] and 
[its] reproduction in art, humanity carved out the interior 
space in which representation is harbored: the space of life 
for death, the death that lives a human life and, in 
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achieving consciousness, represents, survives, and lives 
again.4 
Here, side by side, lie Hegel’s notion that “death lives a human life” and the 
Freudian psyche as harbor for representation, which is first only unconscious.  
Kristeva’s words unify the production of psychic space itself with the 
genesis of the aesthetic. Henceforth the imaginary and symbolic fulfillments 
of the Freudian harbor are alterations in the transition between the invisible 
and the visible, going from the invisible as the “beyond” that is death and its 
powers, for skull worship, to the translating of an invisible “world beyond” 
into its visible lines in the economy of the icon, to John the Baptist, who, 
“prefigure par excellence, lends his figure to the figuration of the invisible 
par excellence: the passage.” We come here to the passage of thought in 
gesture and lines that is itself conveyed in the self-portrait of Artemesia 
Gentelechi, whose head is in her painting arm. 
What occupies the foreground in Kristeva’s commentary is no doubt the 
rich interlocking of the styles and temporalities of these images and 
symbols. Nonetheless, the alterations in the transition between the invisible 
and the visible demonstrate shifts in the border between the conscious and 
the unconscious as regards these aesthetic powers. The macabre introjection 
to which skull worship attests begins the interiorization of mortality and so 
the production of psychic space. Yet the skillful hand imprinting itself in 
paint is not aware that it is the hand of a human creator, even as these 
sacrificers imagining the invisible and pursuing the visible are “inhabited” 
by the unconscious.5 It will be other moments, then, in which consciousness 
arises, to the point of self-knowledge of the draftsman—as of the interior 
space.  
We can begin our approach to the other historical element in this text—
a development since Freud on the presence of and relation to horror in 
psychoanalysis—by discerning a further twist in the transitions between the 
invisible and the visible in The Severed Head’s penultimate chapter, “The 
Powers of Horror.” Here the passage of thought in gesture and lines is 
overlapped by the passage that is the power of horror: figure and disfigure; 
source of modernist styles that “cut through the forms, volumes, and 
contours to expose the pulsing flesh.”6 Because the power of horror is 
contagion the passage may become permanent: horror-fetish.  Imaginary 
intimacy with death, which transforms melancholy or desire into 
representation and thought, is now confronted with intimate instability. 
Decapitation is rendered as the brutal admission of our internal fractures, 
the self-perception of a fundamental imbalance of that “dark work” that is the 
speaking being: divided and unreconciled. What kind of self-perception 
could this be, first, if not the recurring outer limit of that all-too-visible 
manifestation of a “demonic” power in the Freudian clinic: repetition-
compulsion, the never-ending scenario of loves and hates whose clinical 
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location sets it apart from the passage to the act of murder but which is, like 
that passage, equally visible to itself and deprived of vision or reflection.7  
The chapter on powers of horror offers the image as a possible challenge 
directed at the horror “through the invention of an unprecedented form, which 
doesn’t shrink from abjection but reshapes our vision so that we see it with 
new eyes”—and this means traversing the feminine powers of horror, given 
that “the power of horror is nothing without the power of the feminine.”8 For 
example, Kristeva discerns in Flaubert’s final work a conflict between two 
powers and an indecision over two identifications: on the one hand, an 
identification with insolent feminine desire in Salome’s dance, the Psyche-
butterfly, and the complicity between mother and daughter over its reward; 
on the other, Flaubert’s identification with the promise offered by the 
sacrifice of man. Salome or John the Baptist?  Kristeva finds a moment of 
resolution for this in Flaubert’s phrase for the disciples’ intervention upon 
the feminine powers of horror in the complicity between mother and 
daughter. “Because the head was very heavy, they took it in turns to carry 
it.” But she does not leave us with the words of a novelist at the end of his 
life, more inclined to identify with the promise of man’s self-sacrifice. She 
exercises her own capital act of writing on his phrase, by shortening it, and 
thereby turning it into a logic of relay for us: “Because the head was very 
heavy, they took it in turns.”9 Women psychoanalysts and detective writers 
now surge forth as “passionate pilgrims to the high places of carnage,” 
masters of an absolute humor “that is the desire for [the] knowledge… of 
where the human desire to kill one’s neighbor comes from.”10  
This brings me to the thought of a minor history of horror in 
psychoanalysis. Its first moment is the horror with which the law of 
universal love struck Freud: his recoil from the pain that his neighbor has in 
store for him.11 The second moment comes where Lacan takes this up in his 
seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, whose speeches on the relation to the 
other and who the other is for us foreground “the evil in which he [Freud] 
doesn’t hesitate to locate man’s deepest heart.”12 In Lacan’s words: “I retreat 
from loving my neighbor as myself because there is something there that is 
engaged in some form of intolerable cruelty.”13 This leads him to an ethical 
stance that he produces directly before his audience. “I who stand here right 
now and bear witness to the idea that there is no law of the good except in 
evil and through evil,” adding the hesitation “should I bear such 
witness?”—this hesitation underlining the uncertainty of the interpreting 
being, the analyst, who in every case, for Lacan, is the sole ground of his 
interpretations. From horror as original pain in the relation to the other, to 
horror as evil and the lonely, uncertain absolute master, we come to the 
third moment, our current one, where Kristeva presents the power of horror 
that is nothing without the power of the feminine, for it is to the power of 
the feminine that she has accorded the infantile and unconscious terror of 
death and fear of castration, the latent meanings of the capital act. Julia 
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Kristeva brings us, not to beauty as the final barrier to the zone of death (as 
does Lacan in his treatment of Antigone in Seminar VII) but, rather, to graphic 
economies that saturate and exhaust those latent meanings. Our alternatives 
to the realization of the passion for death in the passage to the act of murder 
that is without vision or thought are, in the end, gifts of the time for 
reflection—precisely what the “other passage” is not accorded: time for self-
reflection as image and as meditation. We have been invited to cherish in the 
graphic economies their very real effects, even political consequences. Image 
and meditation could be intimate resistance, including to rationalized murder: 
capital punishment. 
The tone of possibility and invitation takes on a rare imperative note at 
the point where Kristeva marks “the first crossroads in modern figuration” 
and the Figure as a representational stance whose flowerings “remain for us 
to explore.” The imperative note quietly echoes Freud’s opposition of 
preparedness for anxiety to trauma. Beginning from the invitation in the 
Figure to regard by reading, to join the image to the text, the visible to the 
history and the myth, she writes: “we must be prepared to experience the figure 
severed and whole… to inhabit it… horror and promise.”14 From Freud’s 
horror at the source of the commandment of love to Lacan standing, not long 
after the atomic explosion, before evil at the source of a certain 
philosophical, Western culture of ethics, to the powers of horror is not of 
course a linear movement. Yet it is a minor history of psychoanalysis. 
Kristevan power of horror, circling on the archaic feminine, allows her to 
bring to pain and to this “evil” not a resolution but, in her own terms, their 
interim: imaginary and symbolic achievements of deferral and detour, where 
lies an invitation to the time and space of exploration of the flowerings of the 
imaginary intimacy with horror and death.  
Recalling that she briefly counts herself among those who, after Hannah 
Arendt, denounce the suspension of judgment, one “must” answer her 
invitation with: “Should I?” I would underline Kristeva’s preference in her 
final chapter of The Severed Head for Picasso’s Woman with Ruff: the triumph 
for the head and love, the beloved intimacy in which the capital act of 
painting a woman’s head is an affectionate flaying.15  So I partially accept her 
vision of the final depths of the sacred that is the capacity for representation, 
and her answer to the question: “what do they make of it, man and woman, 
when they know where that comes from?”—“They remember. They pass it 
and pass it again. And they laugh at it.” So I thank Kelly Oliver for the 
absolute humor of her choice of text for a marvelous academic form of the 
pass: panelized decapitation! 
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